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NOTES AND COMMENTS
NOTE: COMMITMENT OF THE MEN-
TALLY ILL: DUE PROCESS FOR THE
AGED?
The increasing public awareness of the
problem of mental illness has prompted
many state legislatures to provide often
overly facile means of confining alleged in-
competents for the purpose of care and treat-
ment. The extent to which the rights of the
mentally ill are being affected by such pro-
cedures in the fifty states is currently the
subject of an extensive research project of
the American Bar Foundation. The detailed
nature of the statutes in this area precludes
such a study here. The commitment pro-
cedures used in the State of New York there-
fore are presented in some detail in an effort
to point out the problem which exists, in
varying degrees, throughout the United
States.
Few areas of social endeavor have re-
ceived such attention in recent years as has
the problem of the care and treatment of
the mentally ill. The increasing awareness
that an unbalanced state of mind is in fact an
illness,1 to be recognized and treated as such,
rather than evidence of demoniac posses-
sion, 2 has caused modern society to expend
huge sums for the creation and maintenance
1 N.Y.S. LEG. ANN., Governor's Messages to the
Legislature, Mental Health 448, 450 (1960).
2 See Weihofen and Overholser, Commitment of
the Mentally 111, 24 TEXAS L. REV. 307, 309
(1946).
of mental institutions and facilities. 3 The
methods by which an alleged incompetent,
innocent of any crime, can be committed in
New York State are set forth in the Mental
Hygiene Law. 4 Since there is an extremely
high incidence of psychosis in persons of
advanced years5 and therefore a high rate of
commitment among this segment of society,
an examination of the current law from their
point of view alone seems justified.
With a particular mind to the aged in-
competent, therefore, this article shall in-
vestigate in some detail the provisions of
the Mental Hygiene Law pertinent to his
commitment. Its purpose shall be to deter-
mine, from an analysis of the rights and
remedies afforded, the consequences of a
certification of incompetency, and from the
reported cases bearing on the subject,
whether society, in its anxiety to provide an
increasing amount of medical protection,
has in fact encroached upon the legal pro-
tections of the individual.
General Background
The state's authority over the insane is
deeply entrenched in the law 6 and its justifi-
3 See N.Y.S. Executive Budget 1960-61, LEG.
Doc. No. 80, p. 26 (1960).
4 N. Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW §§ 70-75.
5 See 1957 NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF MENTAL
HYGIENE ANN. REP., LEG. Doc. No. 104, p. 37
(1958).
6 See Sporza v. German Savings Bank, 192 N.Y.
8, 14, 84 N.E. 406, 408 (1908).
cation is said to lie in any of the following:
( 1 ) the police power of the state to alleviate
a danger to society; (2) the nature of the
sovereign as parens patriae for the personal
and proprietary protection of his subjects;
(3) the state's jurisdiction over the poor.7
Old English law made a precise distinction
between the "natural fool" '(writ de idiota
inquirendo) and the "lunatic" (writ de luna-
tico inquirendo) whose mental condition
arose later in life.8 In the former case the
king had the right to all the profits from the
idiot's land while in the latter the king was
entitled only to possession and could not
take the profits. 9 In both cases, however,
it appears that the determination of mental
deficiency was left to a jury. 10
The State of New York, however, while
recognizing the inherent jurisdiction of the
Chancellor in this area, apparently left the
necessity of a jury trial to his discretion.'1
The Chancellor, as a matter of custom, sum-
moned a jury in doubtful cases 12 and the
early statutes dealing with insanity expressly
gave the alleged incompetent, or someone in
his behalf, the right to a jury trial, if such
was requested within a specified time after
the court's decision. 13
Section 76 of the Mental Hygiene Law
provides for a jury trial upon request if the
request is made within thirty days after the
final order of commitment. While the right
7 Kittrie, Compulsory Mental Treatment and the
Requirements of "Due Process," 21 OHIO ST. L.
J. 28, 32-33 (1960). See Ross, Commitment of
the Mentally Ill: Problems of Law and Policy,
57 MICH. L. REV. 945, 955-60 (1959).
s 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 302-05 (6th ed.
1774).
() Id. at 303.
10 Ibid.
11 See Sporza v. German Savings Bank, supra
note 6.
'2 Id. at 17, 84 N.E. at 409.
13 See, e.g., Laws of New York 1842, ch. 135,
§ 21; Laws of New York 1874, ch. 446, art. 1,
§ 11; Laws of New York 1896, ch. 545, § 63.
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to a jury trial in a proceeding such as this is
not guaranteed by the federal constitution, 4
the provisions of section 76 have been held
to constitute an absolute right guaranteed by
the state constitution.15 A minority of the
states today likewise provides a jury trial
only upon request; the majority has dis-
pensed with it altogether, possibly' 6 on the
theory that the nature of this proceeding is
such that a criminal atmosphere should be
avoided.
Notice and Hearing
In a case involving an alleged incompe-
tent,1 7 the United States Supreme Court has
held -that "the essential elements of due
process of law are notice and opportunity to
defend."18 Most states, however, provide for
a waiver of this notice to the alleged in-
competent if it would be ineffective or harm-
ful to him.1 9 The general feeling in this area
is perhaps best summed up by the statement
that:
[l]f in any case notice of application for an
order of commitment is injurious to the in-
sane, such notice should not be held to be
a constitutional requirement; for while as
a rule notice and hearing is of the essence
of due process of law, this is so simply be-
cause in nearly all conceivable cases it is
a requirement of justice which can do no
harm, whereas in this case it would result
in harm to the person intended to be bene-
14 See Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 427 (1901).
15 In the Matter of Coates, 9 N.Y.2d 242, 173
N.E.2d 797, 213 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1961) affirming
8 App. Div. 2d 444, 188 N.Y.S.2d 400 (4th
Dep't 1959). The court, in fact, held the right to
a jury trial as provided for in § 76 so essential that
"nothing short of actual personal service upon the
allegedly ill person can suffice to commence the
running of the 30 day period." 9 N.Y.2d at 252,
173 N.E.2d at 803, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 82.
16 See Ross, Commitment of the Mentally II:
Problems of Law and Policy, 57 MICH. L. REV.
945, 970 (1959).
17 Simon v. Craft, supra note 14.
18 Id. at 436.
19 See Ross, supra note 16, at 969.
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fitted. The constitutional requirement should
be held to be satisfied if there is substituted
for actual previous notice every other safe-
guard which is possible under the circum-
stances.
20
This concern with the "traumatic effects"
of notice and hearing upon an alleged in-
competent apparently forms one of the
strongest obstacles to the adherence to the
usual forms of due process. The understand-
able desire on the part of the medical pro-
fession to treat this problem as a medical
one has brought about the charge that sub-
jecting the alleged incompetent to a hearing,
wherein he is forced to sit and listen to the
testimony of his friends and relatives about
his incompetence, tends only to confuse him
further and hinder his eventual cure.21 In
point of fact, however, most states provide
for hearings of an extremely informal nature,
where the judge, or someone appointed by
him, 22 will go right to the hospital room of
the patient and talk very informally with the
patient, his relatives and the psychiatrists. 23
If the proceedings should become too trying
on -the alleged incompetent, the hearing can
be concluded in a separate room. Moreover,
the "traumatic effects" of "bundling a pa-
tient off" to an institution without a hearing
must also be considered.
It should be noted that this desire to focus
attention upon the medical nature of mental
illness has effected several changes in the
commitment laws and procedures in recent
years. Thus today the term "insanity" bows
20 FREUND, POLICE POWER § 254 (1904).
21 See Hoch, Commitment of Senile Aged to
Mental Hospitals, 139 N.Y.L.J. 4 (Jan. 29, 1958).
Doctor Hoch, Commissioner of Mental Hygiene
of the State of New York, said that "the stigma of
the mental hospital will never be removed, how-
ever, if admission procedures continue to suggest
criminal proceedings."
22 See, e.g., N. Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 74(5).
23 In the Matter of William R. "Jones," 9 Misc.
2d 1084, 172 N.Y.S.2d 869 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
to "mental illness," an "asylum" becomes
a "mental institution '24 and, in New York,
the term "certification" is used instead of
"commitment. '25 Despite the changed ter-
minology a certain stigma still attaches to a
determination of incompetence and obvi-
ously no mere euphemism will suffice to set
aside the traditional judicial safeguards of
due process.
26
A more detailed analysis of the adequacy
of the procedural safeguards provided in
this area will be undertaken by a close in-
spection of the provisions in the New York
Mental Hygiene Law concerning certifica-
tion of the mentally ill to state and licensed
private institutions.
Commitment Procedure in New York
The law, in its present form, provides
six methods27 by which an alleged incom-
petent can be confined to a mental institu-
tion. In general outline they are:
(a) Voluntary admission;
(b) Admission on certificate of a public
health officer;
(c) Admission by certificate of one
physician accompanied by a peti-
tion;
24 For an excellent discussion of the advances in
this area of terminology in recent years see Ross,
supra note 16, at 949-53.
25 For example, N. Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW
§ 74 provides for admission on court certification.
The title of Article 5 of this law, however, (the
article covering admissions) still uses the term
"commitment."
26 See In the Matter of Neisloss, 8 Misc. 2d 912,
171 N.Y.S.2d 875 (Westchester County Ct. 1957).
The court, in a virulent opinion demanded stricter
adherence to the customary forms of due process,
saying, "incarceration, whether called hospitaliza-
tion or by other euphemism, means depriving a
person of liberty. No matter how sweetly dis-
guised or delicate the language, involuntary con-
finement is a loss of freedom." Id. at 913, 171
N.Y.S.2d at 876.
27 N. Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW §§ 70, 73-a. Sec-
(d) Admission by certificate of two
psychiatrists (or one psychiatrist
and one physician) accompanied
by a petition;
(e) Admission by court certification,
with or without a hearing;
(f) Emergency admission on incom-
plete court order.
While there are many differences be-
tween the requirements of the various sec-
tions, ranging from the type and number
of examining physicians and the general
tests for admission to the length of confine-
ment, there are points common to all of
them which should be kept in mind. 28 There
is no distinction made between the "senile
incompetent" and any other alleged incom-
petent.29 The importance of this deficiency
will be brought out later. A more important
facet of the current law, however, is the
fact that admission to state institutions
without the certification of "mental incom-
petency" is impossible.30 Thus "helpless
old people who have suffered physical and
mental impairment" but who are not truly
mentally ill must be certified so by the
courts "since denial of custodial care and
tion 73-a, which was added to the law in 1960,
provides the sixth method.
28 See Appendix.
29 N. Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 2(8) states that
"a 'mentally ill person' means any person afflicted
with mental disease to such an extent that for his
own welfare or the welfare of others, or of the
community, he requires care and treatment .. "
(emphasis added). Section 2(11) does define as
a "dotard" a person of advanced years whose
mental processes have been weakened or impaired,
but who shows no delusional formation, halluci-
nations, behavior or emotional variations charac-
teristic of mental illness. Such person is not suit-
able for admission to a mental institution. Thus,
a distinction is made but it does not appear to be
very meaningful since ofttimes "dotards" are cer-
tified as mentally ill anyway. See note 30 infra.
30 See In the Matter of "Anonymous #1" to "An-
onymous #12," 206 Misc. 909, 138 N.Y.S.2d 30
(Sup. Ct. 1954).
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hospitalization to these people would prob-
ably result in their death .... -31
Voluntary Admission
As the term connotes, section 7131 pro-
vides for the detention for -the purpose of
care and treatment of a person who makes
voluntary application therefor. The appli-
cant can be detained for a period not ex-
ceeding fifteen days and, after he has given
written notice of his intention to leave, he
can be detained for an additional ten
days. 33
It will be observed that a certain period
of involuntary confinement can result after
the patient has made voluntary application
for admission. Despite the fact that the
patient signs himself in with knowledge of
this provision, such a statute requiring a
period of involuntary detention has been
held unconstitutional in the State of New
Mexico, where it was stated by 'the highest
court that "obviously, it does not require
citation of authority that one may not en-
force such a contract made with a person
he knows to be so disordered in mind as to
require treatment in an institution for the
treatment of mental diseases. '34 This view,
however, appears to be in the extreme mi-
nority, 35 and in New York, by opinion of
the Attorney-General, 3 such a provision is
constitutional. It should be noted that be-
fore a 1958 amendment3 7 to the Mental
Hygiene Law the detention and waiting
periods were sixty and fifteen days respec-
tively.
31 Id. at 910, 138 N.Y.S.2d at 31.
32 N. Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 71.
33 Ibid.
34 Ex parte Romero, 51 N.M. 201,-, 181 P.2d
811, 813 (1947).
35 See Curran, Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill,
31 N.C.L. REV. 274, 278 (1953).
36 1923 N.Y. ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 332.
37 N. Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 71, as amended,
N.Y. Sess. Laws 1958, ch. 108, § 1.
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That this section is providing an increas-
ingly satisfactory means of coping with the
problem of mental illness can be seen from
the recent statement of the Governor to
the legislature:
The public's growing acceptance of [mental
disease as a medical matter] ... is reflected
in the rapidly increasing proportion of vol-
untary admissions. As recently as five years
ago fewer than 7 percent of the patients
entered state hospitals on a voluntary basis;
today 30 percent use a voluntary pro-
cedure.38
Admission on Certificate of a
Public Health Officer
Under section 7239 a person determined
by a mental health officer or his designee
to be "dangerous to himself or others and
who needs immediate care and treatment
because of mental illness" may be received
and cared for by the director of the mental
institution for not more than sixty days.4 °
Moreover, if the patient has not signed
himself voluntarily into the hospital during
this time and the director deems further
care and treatment necessary, the mental
health officer will have the alleged incom-
petent examined by "one or two" physi-
cians and if they agree on the need for
further care he shall be admitted under the
provisions of sections 73 or 74.41 This sec-
tion also provides that the police shall take
the alleged incompetent into custody if the
mental health officer so requests. 42
No provision is made for notice and
hearing under this section. Moreover, since
the right to request a jury trial exists only
38 N. Y. S. LEG. ANN., Governor's Messages to the
Legislature, Mental Health 448, 450 (1960).
39 N. Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 72.
4 0 N. Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 72(1)(a) (em-
phasis added).
41 N. Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 72(1)(c) (em-
phasis added).
42 N. Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 72(2).
after the final order of commitment, 43 it
would seem that the only remedy left to
the alleged incompetent is that of habeas
corpus. 44 The difficulties attendant upon
the attempt by an institutionalized incom-
petent to initiate such a proceeding are
many.4" Why an alleged incompetent can
be confined for up to sixty days in such an
ex parte proceeding as this, while the max-
imum length of detention under the emer-
gency commitment section is but ten days, 4
does not seem quite clear.
Admission by Certificate of One Physician
Commonly referred to as a "pink form"
procedure 47 (a reference to the Depart-
ment of Mental Hygiene form which must
be filled out in accord with this section)
this method4s has come under heavy fire
from the judiciary.49 All that is required
under this section is a petition (the exact
43 N. Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 76; In the
Matter of Gurland, 286 App. Div. 704, 146
N.Y.S.2d 830 (2d Dept), appeal dismissed, 309
N.Y. 969, 132 N.E.2d 331 (1955).
44 N. Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 204 specifically
grants the right to apply for a writ of habeas
corpus and, upon the return of such writ, a deter-
mination of competence will be made. This right
to apply for discharge at any time has been held
to satisfy the requirements of due process in the
absence of an initial hearing. People ex rel. Pea-
body v. Chanler, 133 App. Div. 159, 117 N.Y.
Supp. 322 (2d Dept), afl'd, 196 N.Y. 525, 89
N.E. 1109 (1909); FREUND, POLICE POWER § 255
(1904).
45 For examples of the obstacles facing the alleged
incompetent in his quest for a writ of habeas
corpus see Hoff v. State, 279 N.Y. 490, 18 N.E.2d
671 (1939); People ex rel. Jacobs v. Worthing,
167 Misc. 702, 4 N.Y.S.2d 630 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
46 N. Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 75.
47 See Brenner, Commitment of Senile Aged to
Mental Hospitals, 139 N.Y.L.J. 4 (Jan. 29, 1958).
Justice Brenner is a Justice of the New York State
Supreme Court.
48 N. Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 73.
49 See Brenner, supra note 47. See also In the
Matter of William R. "Jones," 9 Misc. 2d 1084,
172 N.Y.S.2d 869 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
requirements of which are set forth in sec-
tion 74) stating the facts upon which com-
mitment is sought, accompanied by a
certificate of one examining physician that
the patient is men-tally ill. Thereupon the
director of the institution may accept the
alleged incompetent "who does not object
thereto" for up to sixty days and thereafter
until fifteen days from the time the patient
or someone in his behalf gives written indi-
cation of his intent to leave.5 0
The statute is apparently justified on the
theory that lack of positive objection is
tantamount to consent. 51 This section, how-
ever, has been particularly instrumental in
effecting the transfer of the senile aged to
mental institutions "without judicial sanc-
tion and with a minimum of public notice
or criticism."'52 Although it has been rec-
ognized that the institution has no right to
accept a patient who does object53 and the
Department of Mental Hygiene has stated
that the transfer agents have been in-
structed not to accept such patients, 54 the
precise meaning of "positive objection" is
still apparently unclear. 55
A more cogent point to consider would
seem to be the condition of those patients
from whom "positive objection" is re-
quired if they are to be spared the stigma
of mental incompetence. In one case, 56 al-
though it arose under a section 74 pro-
ceeding, four of the alleged incompetents
included: a seventy-eight year old woman,
50 N. Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 73 (emphasis
added).
51 See In the Matter of William R. "Jones," supra
note 49.
52 Brenner, supra note 47.
53 1946 N.Y. ATT'Y. GEN. ANN. REP. 265.
54 See Hoch, Commitment of Senile Aged to
Mental Hospitals, 139 N.Y.L.J. 4 (Jan. 29, 1958).
55 Ibid. See also Brenner, supra note 47.
56 In the Matter of "Anonymous #1" to "Anony-
mous #12," 206 Misc. 909, 138 N.Y.S.2d 30
(Sup. Ct. 1954).
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unable to walk because of apermanent hip
injury, overtalkative and almost blind; a
seventy-eight year old man who had suf-
fered several strokes and loss of memory;
an eighty-four year old man growing pro-
gressively senile; and a sixty-four year old
man with -a speech difficulty due to aphasia.
Considered in this light more force is in-
stilled into the remark made by Justice
Brenner before the legislative committee
last year: "Imagine a positive objection
from an old man or an old woman, some-
times in very advanced years, 80 or 90
years of age. I feel rather badly about
th is. "'5'
As has already been stated, 58 it may be
the case that a court is virtually forced to
certify certain unwanted helpless seniles.
Nonetheless such a commitment procedure
as provided in this section has been held to
be objectionable "because the possibility of
private care, often provided at a judicial
hearing, is denied to them and, of course,
they cannot thereafter effect their own re-
lease." 59 The distinct possibility of judicial
hearings providing more preferable alter-
natives than commitment is not to be
doubted.60 The section does provide for
57 Hearing Before N.Y. Joint Leg. Committee on
Problems of the Aging, at 21 (March 10, 1960).
58 See text accompanying note 31 supra.
59 In -the Matter of William R. "Jones," 9 Misc.2d
1084, 1085, 172 N.Y.S.2d 869, 870 (Sup. Ct.
1958).
60 The extent to which this is true was graphically
illustrated by Justice Brenner of the New York
Supreme Court in an interview granted the author
on February 24, 1961. Justice Brenner told of an
instance in November, 1960 when he had occasion
to deny certification of nine alleged incompetents
because they were not considered truly mentally
ill. A follow-up of the fortunes of these alleged
incompetents revealed the following information:
two were placed in private nursing homes; two
were discharged to the custody of their sons; one
was discharged to the custody of his wife; one
died one week later; three were subsequently
certified incompetent by other judges.
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release after the initial sixty days upon
presentation of written request therefor
either by the patient or someone in his
behalf.61 It seems obvious, however, that
in the case of the unwanted senile there is
no reason to expect positive action at this
later date either.
Admission on the Certificate of
Two Physicians Accompanied by Petition
The Governor, in requesting the passage
of this section 62 last year stated that "such
an arrangement emphasizes the medical na-
ture of hospitalization procedures, pre-
serves the Constitutional rights of the
patient and provides any necessary protec-
tion to society at large." 63 One bill pro-
posed but not acted upon by the legislature
advocated its outright repeal; 64 another,
likewise killed in committee, would have
continued it in force with insignificant
amendments. 65
Admission under this section requires a
petition on prescribed forms, as in the fore-
going section, accompanied by a certificate
of two psychiatrists or one psychiatrist and
one physician.66 The director of the insti-
tution, however, if he is satisfied of the
need for care and treatment and admits the
alleged incompetent, must give him written
notice of the application within three days
after admission except when the two physi-
cians state that the notice would be inef-
fective or detrimental to him.6 7 Whether or
not notice to the patient is dispensed with,
it must be given to the nearest relative of
61 N. Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 73.
62 N. Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 73-a.
63 N.Y.S. LEG. ANN., Governor's Messages to the
Legislature, Mental Health 448, 450 (1960).
64 S. Int. 60, Pr. 60 (1961).
65A. Int. 1454, Pr. 1454 (1961).
6 6 N. Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 73-a(1).
67 Ibid.
the alleged incompetent other than the pe-
titioner, or, if there be no one else, then to
the patient's community health officer. 5
The length of detention under this section
is limited to sixty days, and if the director
of the institution deems further care neces-
sary he must attempt to get a voluntary
commitment or a commitment under the
provisions of section 73.69 If either of these
methods fails, the director must apply for
court certification under the provisions of
section 74.70
Clearly, a primary difference between
sections 73 and 73-a is the fact that the
latter ostensibly requires that notice be
given to the alleged incompetent or some-
one in his behalf. Since, however, even in
proceedings seeking court certification, it is
almost a matter of course to state that such
notice would be harmful -to the patient, 71
this section would seem to parallel section
73 as a "legally authorized solution for
continuing to admit aged and docile seniles
to state mental institutions without judicial
sanction and with a minimum of public
notice or criticism." 72
Admission by Court Certification
As the title implies section 7473 is the
68 Ibid.
69 N. Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 73-a(2). If the
latter procedure is used it would seem that there
would be even less chance of "positive objection"
since the alleged incompetent will already be in the
institution.
70 Ibid.
71 In the Matter of Neisloss, 8 Misc. 2d 912, 171
N.Y.S.2d 875 (Westchester County Ct. 1957).
"Invariably the court is requested to dispense with
personal service on the alleged incompetent for the
stereotyped reason that 'to do so would unduly
disturb the patient'." Id. at 912-13, 171 N.Y.S.2d
at 876.
72 Brenner, Commitment of Senile Aged to Mental
Hospitals, 139 N.Y.L.J. 4 (Jan. 29, 1958) (em-
phasis added).
73 N. Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 74.
only section which provides for any sort of
judicial sanction in the first instance. Ba-
sically it requires a petition executed by a
close relative or any person who resides
with the alleged incompetent, a certificate
of need of care and treatment by two exam-
ining physicians, and a hearing.74 Notice to
the alleged incompetent or someone in his
behalf is also required.7 5 The notice to the
incompetent may be dispensed with if the
court feels it would be ineffective or detri-
mental to the alleged incompetent and it
must be dispensed with if the two physi-
cians so state in writing.76 The hearing
itself may be dispensed with at the discre-
tion of the court if no specific application
for a hearing is made on behalf of the
patient. 7  If there is a certification of mental
incompetence following a hearing, the per-
son is admitted to the mental institution
and detained for a period not exceeding
sixty days. If there is no hearing the length
of detention is the same. 78 However, if,
during that ,time the director of the institu-
tion determines a need for further care and
treatment the mere filing of this determina-
tion in the county clerk's office will make
the order final.79 It should be emphasized
again that the director of the institution,
here, as in all the other sections,80 may
refuse to accept the patient if he finds him
mentally competent.
The scarcity of the reported cases in this
area of certification is clearly no indication
of the staggering volume of applications
handled by the courts.8 ' The great number
74 N. Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 74(1).
75 N. Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 74(3).
76 Ibid.
77 N. Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 74(4).
78 N. Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 74(7).
7 Ibid.
SON. Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW §§ 74(8), 71,
72(1)(a), 73, 73-a(1), 75.
81 See In the Matter of Neisloss, 8 Misc. 2d 912,
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of applications has indeed caused one court
to remark:
There is always the danger of allowing the
judicial process to become a matter of rote
and routine. We have perhaps reached that
unhappy state in these proceedings ...
Speed is not necessarily synonymous with
justice; nor is it desirable that our courts
degenerate into assembly lines.8 2
The reported cases do, however, point
up the problems existent throughout the
area. As has already been seen, admission
to a mental institution without the certifica-
tion of mental incompetence is impos-
sible.8 3 In order to effect the admission of
an aged unwanted senile, therefore, an at-
tempt is made to stretch mental deteriora-
tion, due solely to old age, into the. psy-
chosis necessary for certification. 4 Witness
the remark of Justice Brenner to the legis-
lative committee in this regard:
I may say to you that I have had dozens and
dozens of experiences, doctors sitting right
next to me at the time that I certify a person
into a mental institution, telling me very
candidly that this person is just old, his
mind is tired just the same as many other
parts of his body. They call him senile. As
a doctor, -he says, I cannot say he is disturbed
or mentally ill. Physically he is tired and the
brain tissue is tired out.8
5
This observation is echoed by several
171 N.Y.S.2d 875 (Westchester County Ct. 1957).
"[D]uring the .past year approximately 50 to 60
petitions were presented to me [Garrity, J.] each
month for the commitment of allegedly mentally
ill persons." Id. at 912, 171 N.Y.S.2d at 876.
82 Id. at 913-14, 171 N.Y.S.2d at 877.
83 See In the Matter of "Anonymous #1" to "An-
onymous #12," 206 Misc. 909, 138 N.Y.S.2d 30
(Sup. Ct. 1954).
84 In the Matter of Anonymous No. 13, 6 Misc.
2d 596, 159 N.Y.S.2d 842 (Sup. Ct. 1957); accord,
In the Matter of "Anonymous #1" to "Anony-
mous # 12," supra note 83.
85 Hearing Before N.Y. Joint Leg. Committee on
Problems of the Aging, at 13 (March 10, 1960).
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judges who come into constant contact
with the problem.8 6
Emergency Admission on
Incomplete Court Order
Section 7587 permits the director of a
mental institution to receive a patient upon
presentation of a certificate by two physi-
cians and of a petition as required under
section 74, but prior to the court certifica-
tion, when the director believes either that
the patient's condition is such that it would
be for his benefit to receive immediate care
and treatment or that he is dangerous by
virtue of his condition so that public safety
makes his confinement necessary. 8s Deten-
tion is for a maximum of ten days unless
certification is effected through one of the
other sections.8 9
The state clearly has the right to tem-
porarily confine a person dangerous to
society,90 and a mental ward for an obvi-
ously deranged person is certainly -to be
preferred to a jail cell while awaiting a
hearing.91 Some have questioned the test
of benefit to the patient as a ground for
immediate confinement. The argument has
been presented that there are many other
instances where a person might benefit by
a certain course of action, yet society does
not impose it upon him.92 Nonetheless, the
86Id. at 10-13.
87 N. Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 75.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
90 See Note, Comments on a Draft Act for the
Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 19 GEo. WASH.
L. REV. 512, 521 (1951).
91 See Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Ill:
Problems of Law and Policy, 57 MICH. L. REV.
945 (1959). The author mentions an unreported
instance where an alleged incompetent was ar-
rested by a sheriff, with a warrant, and placed in a
jail cell prior-to a hearing the following morning.
His legal rights were preserved. He hanged himself
during the night. Id. at 966.
92 Id. at 959.
very factor in question in this area is the
alleged incompetent's inability to make a
responsible decision and realize what is
beneficial for him. Under such circum-
stances the general trend is for the state to
provide the immediate care and treatment
for the short period before the hearing 93 on
the assumption that the patient is incapable
of making a responsible decision, although
this assumption could be proven wrong at
the subsequent hearing.
Some Consequences of the Certification
of Incompetence
The rights and powers of persons certi-
fied to mental institutions throughout the
fifty states have not been clearly defined.
94
In New York it appears that persons certi-
fied to mental institutions without formal
adjudication of incompetence are, techni-
cally, alleged incompetents and the deeds
and contracts made by such persons are
voidable, not void. 95 The courts have dis-
tinguished between the formal adjudication
of incompetence resulting from a proceed-
ing under Article 81 of the Civil Practice
Act which provides for the appointment of
a committee over one's person and prop-
erty,96 and the certification to a mental
institution under the provisions of the Men-
tal Hygiene Law.9 7 As a practical matter,
93 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 911/2, §§ 6-1 - 6-6
(Smith-Hurd 1960); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1184
(Supp. 1960); TEX. MENTAL HEALTH CODE art.
5547-27 - 5547-30 (1958).
94 See Ross, supra note 91, at 981.
95 Finch v. Goldstein, 245 N.Y. 300, 157 N.E. 146
(1927); accord, In the Matter of Lugo, 10 Misc.
2d 576, 172 N.Y.S.2d 104 (Ct. of Claims 1958)
(dictum)., rev'd on other grounds, 8 App. Div. 2d
877, 187 N.Y.S.2d 59 (3rd Dep't 1959) (memo-
randum decision).
9 6 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT §§ 1356-1384.
97 Finch v. Goldstein, supra note 95; accord, Mc-
Cabe v. State, 208 Misc. 485, 144 N.Y.S.2d 445
(Ct. of Claims 1947). The latter case points out
just how close certification under the Mental Hy-
252
however, the regulations of the Department
of Mental Hygiene provide a substantial
deterrent to any commercial transactions
contemplated by alleged incompetents." s
Prescinding from any questions of legal
capacity to make contracts, wills, or deeds,
the social consequences of commitment of,
for example, a borderline senile of ad-
vanced years are not to be taken lightly.
Incompetence is but a synonym for insan-
ity.9 9 Yet, in many of the instances men-
tioned above, helpless old persons, very
often invalids at the point of death, are
sought to be certified to mental institu-
tions.10 0 It has also been pointed out that a
certain stigma follows the members of the
family of an incompetent who are very
often required to state the existence of
mental illness in the family when applying
for insurance policies or even when seeking
employment.' 0 ' The proper forum for the
giene Law comes to a formal adjudication of
incompetency. Although a jury trial is provided
for in the first instance under the Civil Practice
Act, if the director of a state institution, desirous of
having any property a patient might own applied
to the payment of his hospital bills, applies for
the appointment of a committee, the mere fact
that the patient has been certified to the institution
will be sufficient proof of incompetence and no
jury trial will be necessary. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. ACT §
1374. A committee thus appointed will continue
with all the powers of a committee appointed un-
der this article of the Civil Practice Act.
98 See Rules and Regulations of the Commissioner
of Mental Hygiene, General Order No. 10(b),
appended to N. Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 34;
In re Aliexieff's Will, 94 N.Y.S.2d 32 (Surr. Ct.
1949), aff'd, 277 App. Div. 790, 97 N.Y.S.2d 532,
leave to appeal denied, 277 App. Div. 901, 98
N.Y.S.2d 582 (1950).
99 In the Matter of Lugo, supra note 95.
100 In this connection it will be noted that one of
the persons sought to be certified before Justice
Brenner in the instance mentioned in note 60,
supra, died one week after the denial of the appli-
cation.
101 Hearing Be/ore N.Y. Joint Leg. Committee on
Problems of the Aging, at 12 (March 10, 1960).
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balancing of these various interests would
seem to be the court, and yet, as has been
pointed out, this judicial supervision ii in-
itially provided for in only one of the vari-
ous involuntary commitment procedures.
Conclusions
The inherent medico-legal nature of the
problem of commitment of the mentally ill
must be recognized. It is an area wherein
a delicate balance must be struck between
the anxiety over the person's physical
health and the respect for his legal rights.
Several aspects of the present law, it is
submitted, are deficient in the legal safe-
guards they provide. In the case of helpless
aged persons, due process, although pro-
vided for in the language of the statute, is
often denied in reality.
Although it might be considered a man-
ifestation of extreme naivet6 to mention the
term "railroading" in this day and age, yet,
albeit in a different sense from that origi-
nally used, the term is descriptive of a very
real problem. This is so, it is submitted,
because to deny judicial supervision in the
first instance to confused aged seniles, very
often confined to bed, is little different,
practically speaking, from denying it alto-
gether. Granted the medical safeguards are
many, with the final decision concerning
admission contingent upon the psychiatric
examination conducted by the director of
the institution, such protection, as one
court has pointed out, 102 is simply inade-
quate. Concededly, the state has no desire
to detain those who are not truly mentally
ill, yet two observations must be made. In
the first place, if for no other reason than
a genuine desire to provide some care for
these helpless persons, it seems clear that
102 Ex parte Romero, 51 N.M. 201,-, 181 P.2d
811, 813 (1947).
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the term "mental illness" has been broadly
construed by many doctors. Secondly, and
perhaps of greater import, is the fact that
the determination of incompetence often
involves a "social judgment" which doctors
are not necessarily most qualified to make.
An illustration of the latter point is In
the Matter of Burke10 3 where the court
refused to appoint a committee for a ninety-
five year old man, admittedly suffering from
senile debility, but who had already com-
mitted his money and property to a trust
directing payment to himself for life and to
charity. after his death. Seeing that the
alleged incompetent's affairs were in order,
the court refused to disturb the "peaceful
serenity" of his old age. The question im-
mediately comes to mind as to the neces-
sity, in the case of a non-ambulatory senile
of advanced years, of shunting him off to
his death in a mental institution. Custodial
care, rather than psychiatric treatment,
would seem to be his prime need and if
this can be provided only at the cost of a
certification of mental incompetency the
price is altogether too high.
A major problem, of course, is the lack
of such custodial facilities. Such a problem
obviously will not be alleviated overnight,
but a bill,' 04 which died in committee be-
fore the 1961 legislature, proposed a defi-
nitely forward step. The bill sought to
establish a division of geriatrics in the De-
partment of Mental Hygiene, the settirig
aside of geriatric wings or wards in the
existing state mental institutions, and the
admission into such state mental institu-
tions of non-psychotic aged and infirm per-
sons and other persons not mentally ill.1 5
Actually the bill would merely have given
103 125 App. Div. 889, 110 N.Y. Supp. 1004 (1st
Dep't 1908).
104 S. Int. 1563, Pr. 1604 (1961).
105 Ibid.
legal sanction to a practice which the de-
partment has been utilizing for some time,
that is, caring for elderly persons not truly
ill, in segregated quarters, 1°6 but it no
longer would have required the certifica-
tion of mental incompetence. Although sev-
eral similar bills have failed to obtain
passage in recent years, 10 7 the proposal
provided a basic solution to the specific
problem and should be given increased
attention and support in the next session
of the legislature.
Another bill' 08 of lesser magnitude, also
killed before a legislative committee this
year, is worthy of mention. This proposed
legislation would have made state institu-
tions responsible for the care and treatment
of helpless aged persons of the state as well
as for the care of the mentally ill. A new
subdivision would have been added to sec-
tion 74 providing that:
A helpless aged person or dotard may be
admitted to a state hospital in the same
manner as a person alleged to be mentally
ill . 109
Such a provision, though narrower in scope
than the first bill mentioned, is evidently to
be preferred to the present situation where
the court is often faced with the alternative
of either providing no care for a helpless
aged person or certifying him mentally ill
when such is not the case.
The existing provisions for certification
of the mentally ill in New York are con-
fused and disoriented. They present a stag-
gering and often overlapping variety of
tests for admission and periods of deten-
tion. In only one section is there any true
opportunity for judicial surveillance despite
the expressed desire of members of the
106S. Int. 1563, Pr. 1604 (1961).
107 See N.Y.S. LEG. ANN. 591 (1957).
108 A. Int. 434, Pr. 434 (1961).
109 A. Int. 434, Pr. 434 § 2 (1961).
judiciary to undertake such a burden. Such
is the state of the law in an area where
"the persons involved are usually incapable
of asserting their rights and privileges in
their own behalf."' 110
Section 71, insofar as people will volun-
tarily avail themselves of it, currently pro-
vides one very satisfactory method of
treating the problems in the area. The
shorter periods of detention and waiting
after indicating a desire to leave serve both
to encourage wider use of this procedure
and diminish any possible constitutional
objections.
Section 72, as we have already indicated,
appears to have little justification. Provision
could just as easily be made for the public
health officer to apply under sections 74
or 75 depending upon the urgency of the
situation. In any case there does not seem
to be any reason for a sixty-day detention
period when but ten days are permitted
under section 75.
Section 73 is based on a fictional test of
consent which, when applied to helpless
old persons, offers the form of a legal safe-
guard without the substance. Since the al-
ternatives in this area of the senile aged
are often poor at best, the very minimum
requirement should be that of placing the
application before the courts so that they,
as the guardians of the alleged incompe-
tent's legal rights, will at least have a say
in determining whether or not some other
course is open in providing care for an
individual who may not be mentally ill at
all.
Section 73-a likewise provides little more
than a speedy conduit for effecting the
confinement of the confused and embar-
110 In the Matter of Neisloss, 8 Misc. 2d 912, 171
N.Y.S.2d 875 (Westchester County Ct. 1957).
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rassed senile. As a practical matter, notice
to him is most often dispensed with, and if,
as we hypothecate, he is alone and un-
wanted, it is not likely that any application
for discharge will be made in his behalf so
as either to bring about his release or, 'at
least, a judicial inquiry. Serious considera-
tion should be given to the revision of both
of the above sections so as to provide ade-
quate safeguards for the aged.
Section 74 is the basic section to which
all of the other sections dealing with invol-
untary commitment ultimately look for ful-
fillment of the requirement of due process.
Although a hearing is mandatory only upon
application, the petition and physicians'
certificates are before the court and the
court can order a hearing or demand fur-
ther proofs in its discretion. Some consid-
eration at least is given to the legal aspects
of the problem. This section would have
been greatly enhanced by the passage of
either of the above-mentioned bills allow-
ing certification as helpless aged persons
rather than as mental incompetents in all
cases.
Section 75 makes the necessary provi-
sion for emergency care and treatment
while awaiting the outcome of a section 74
proceeding. The tests of need for immediate
care or public safety do not make it par-
ticularly applicable to the problem of the
aged. The length of the detention period is
reasonably short and the advantages of hos-
pital confinement over imprisonment while
awaiting a hearing need not be demon-
strated.
The words of a prominent proponent for
reform in this area serve as an appropriate
conclusion:
Until we remedy this situation we go counter
to our Judaeo-Christian heritage and our
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hold the dignity of man and avoid his being
discarded as a human being simply because
he is helpless and no longer productive.'1 ,
Recent Decision:
State's Right of Inquiry
The scales of justice not only balance
right and wrong, but frequently are used
to decide which of two competing rights
may be exercised. The petitioning school-
teachers in Shelton v. Tucker' challenged
a state's right of inquiry on the ground that
it abridged their individual right to freedom
of association. The State of Arkansas had
passed a statute that compelled -every
teacher, as a condition of employment in
state-supported schools, to file an annual
affidavit listing every organization to which
he has belonged or regularly contributed
within the preceding five years. The United
States Supreme Court held that the statute,
as applied to teachers without job security
safeguards, violated their rights under the
fourteenth amendment to the Constitution
by extending the state's right of inquiry
into areas not reasonably related to occu-
pational competence and fitness.
Realizing the sensitive area in which a
teacher works, the state has a vital and
necessary right of inquiry into the fitness
and competency of the teachers it employs.2
A "rule of reason' 3 will be applied to
determine whether the state, in the exercise
of legitimate inquiry, employs means which
111 Hearing Be/ore N.Y. Joint Leg. Committee on
Problems of the Aging, at 24 (March 10, 1960)
(statement of Justice Brenner). For a recent
article pointing out the current anxiety over this
problem in New York see DeCain, Commitment
Procedures and the Non-Mentally Ill, 33 N.Y.S.
BAR J. 151 (1961).
1 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
2 Beilan v. Board of Educ., 357 U.S. 399, 405
(1958); Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485,
493 (1952).
3 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 568-69
(1951) (concurring opinion).
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are consistent with the teacher's constitu-
tional rights. In other words, when the state
exercises its police power over liberty of
the mind, it must do so in a reasonable
manner.
It is reasonable for the state to protect
the "integrity and competency ' 4 of public
employees by restricting them from doing
acts, which, if done by private individuals,
could not be restrained by legislative ac-
tion.5 Any direct inquiry based upon the
standards of competency and fitness set up
for public employment will be held reason-
able.6 All the state must establish is that
the questions asked would be directly de-
terminative of whether the required stan-
dards of competency and fitness have been
met. 7 Whenever the state asks questions
"wholly unrelated"" to the standards, it will
be an unconstitutional infringement on
personal liberties. 9 These liberties are guar-
anteed by the due process clause of the
4Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 373 (1882).
5 See Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S.
716 (1951); ci. United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell,
330 U.S. 75 (1947). Taking an active part in
political campaigns is not a right guaranteed to
government employees. "[F]undamental human
rights are not absolutes.... [The] Court must bal-
ance the extent of the guarantees of freedom...
to protect a democratic society against the sup-
posed evil of political partisanship ..... Id. at
95-96. See Comment, 65 YALE L. J. 1159 (1956).
6 Beilan v. Board of Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958);
Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958); Adler v.
Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Garner v.
Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
7 Ibid.
s Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 558
(1956).
9 An inquiry for the purpose of rooting out subver-
sives in the school system drawn without regard to
the presence or absence of guilt was deemed an un-
reasonable use of the state authority in Sweezy v.
New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957). Whenever
the dismissal is based upon inferences drawn from
a valid assertion of a constitutional right, rather
than from proven facts, such dismissal will be
termed an unreasonable use of delegated power.
